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Abstract
We study a variant of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with uncertain horizon, in which each player
chooses his foresight ability: that is, the timing in which he is informed about the realized length of
the interaction. In addition, each player has an independent probability to observe the opponent's
foresight ability. We show that if this probability is not too close to zero or one, then the game admits
an evolutionarily stable strategy, in which agents who look one step ahead and agents who look three
steps ahead co-exist. Moreover, this is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy in which players play
eﬃciently at early stages of the interaction. We interpret our results as a novel evolutionary founda-
tion for limited foresight, and as a new mechanism to induce cooperation in the repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma.
KEYWORDS: limited foresight, Prisoner's Dilemma, limit ESS. JEL Classiﬁcation: C73, D03.
1 Introduction
Experimental evidence suggests that people look ahead by only few rounds. For example,
players usually defect only at the last couple of stages when playing a ﬁnitely repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma game (see, e.g., Selten & Stoecker, 1986), and they ignore future opportunities that
are more than a few steps ahead when interacting in sequential bargaining (Neelin et al. , 1988).
A second stylized fact is the heterogeneity of the population: some people systematically look
fewer steps ahead than others (see, e.g., Johnson et al. , 2002).1
These observations raise two related evolutionary puzzles. In many games, the ability to look
∗I would like to express my deep gratitude to Itai Arieli, Vince Crawford, Eddie Dekel, Faruk Gul, Erik
Mohlin, Peyton Young, and seminar participants at Birmingham, Edinburgh, Oxford, Paris, and University
College London, for many useful comments, discussions, and ideas.
1 Similar stylized facts are also observed with respect to the number of strategic iterations in static games,
as suggested by the level-k models (e.g., Stahl & Wilson, 1994; Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al. , 2001.
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ahead by one more step than your opponent can give a substantial advantage. As the cognitive
cost of an additional step is moderate in relatively simple games (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003,
Section 5.3.5), it is puzzling why there has not been an arms race in which people learn to
look many steps ahead throughout the evolutionary process (the so called red queen eﬀect;
Robson, 2003). The second puzzle is how naive people in a heterogeneous population, who
systematically look fewer steps ahead, survive.
In this paper we present a reduced form static analysis of a dynamic evolutionary process
of cultural learning in a large population of agents who play the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.2
Each agent is endowed by a type which determines his foresight ability and his behavior in
the game. Most of the time agents follow the foresight ability and strategy that they have
inherited. Every so often, a few agents experiment with a diﬀerent type. The frequency of
types evolves according to a payoﬀ-monotonic selection dynamic: more successful types become
more frequent. Our main results characterize a stable heterogeneous population in which some
agents look one step ahead and the remaining agents look three steps ahead, and show that this
is the unique stable population in which players cooperate at early stages of the interaction.
It is well known (Nachbar, 1990) that any dynamically stable state can be represented as a
symmetric Nash equilibrium in a 2-player game, in which the players are a metaphor for the
evolutionary process. This game includes an initial round in which players choose their foresight
ability and T rounds of repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, where T is geometrically distributed with
a continuation probability close to one (i.e., a high enough expected length).
At stage 0, each player chooses a foresight ability (abbreviated, ability) from the set {L1, L2,
..., Lk, ...}. A player with ability Lk obtains a private signal at round T−k about the realization
of T. We interpret k as the horizon (i.e., number of remaining steps) in which a player with
ability Lk becomes aware of the strategic implications of the ﬁnal period. We discuss this
interpretation in Section 8.1. In addition, choosing ability Lk bears a cognitive cost of c (Lk),
which is weakly increasing in k (non-monotonic costs are discussed in Section 8.2).
Each player obtains a private signal about his opponent's ability (a` la Dekel et al. , 2007):
(1) the signal reveals the opponent's ability with probability p, and (2) it is non-informative
otherwise (independently of the signal that is observed by the opponent). Our interpretation
is that each player may observe his opponent's behavior in the past or a trait that is correlated
with foresight ability, and he uses such observations to assess his opponent's ability.3
The payoﬀs and actions at stages 1 ≤ t ≤ T are described in Table 1: Mutual cooperation
yields A > 1, mutual defection gives 1, and if a single player defects, he obtains A+ 1 and his
2 This approach was pioneered by Maynard-Smith & Price (1973), and adapted in Guth & Yaari (1992) to
study the evolution of preferences. See also Frenkel et al. (2012)'s application to cognitive biases.
3 In Section 8.2 we relax the assumption that p is exogenous, and allow players to inﬂuence the probability
of observing the opponent's ability.
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Tab. 1: Payoﬀ at the symmetric stage game Prisoner's Dilemma (A > 1).
opponent gets 0.4 The total payoﬀ of the game is the undiscounted sum of payoﬀs.
We begin by characterizing a speciﬁc symmetric Nash equilibrium, σ∗, for every p that is
not too close to zero and one (and the width of this interval is increasing in A, see Figure 1).
The support of σ∗ includes two abilities (dubbed, incumbents): L1 and L3, where µ (L1) is
increasing in A and p. Strategy σ∗ induces a simple deterministic play: when the horizon is
still uncertain players follow a perfect variant of tit-for-tat (dubbed, pavlov): defect if and
only if players have played diﬀerent actions in the previous round.5 Everyone defects at the
last round. A player with ability L3 defects also at the penultimate round, and his behavior at
the previous round (i.e., stage T − 2) depends on the signal about the opponent's ability: he
follows pavlov if it is either L1 or unknown, and defects otherwise.
Intuitively, the equilibrium relies on two observations: (1) if p is not too low, there is a
unique frequency that induces a balance between the direct disadvantage of having ability L1
(loosing one point by cooperating at horizon 2), and its indirect commitment advantage (when
an L3 opponent observes ability L1, it induces him to cooperate an additional round); and (2)
if p is not too high, then it is optimal to follow pavlov at stage T − 3 also when a player has
higher ability than L3.
Nash equilibria may be dynamically unstable. Maynard-Smith & Price (1973) reﬁne it
as follows: Nash equilibrium σ is an evolutionarily stable strategy (abbreviated, ESS ) if it
is a better reply against any other best-reply strategy σ′ (u (σ′, σ) = u (σ, σ) ⇒ u (σ, σ′) >
u (σ′, σ′)). The motivation is that an ESS, if adopted by a population of players, cannot be
invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare. Cressman (1997) shows that an ESS
is dynamically stable for a large set of payoﬀ-monotonic selection dynamics. Repeated games
rarely admit an ESS due to equivalent strategies that diﬀer only in oﬀ-equilibrium paths. In
particular, the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma does not admit any ESS (Lorberbaum, 1994).
4 We assume that defection yields the same additional payoﬀ (relative to cooperation) regardless of the
opponent's strategy to simplify the presentation of the result and their proofs. The results remain qualitatively
similar also without this assumption. Besides this assumption, the table represents a general Prisoner's Dilemma
game (up to an aﬃne normalization).
5 The name Pavlov (Kraines & Kraines, 1989; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993) stems from the fact that it embodies
an almost reﬂex-like response to the payoﬀ of the previous round: it repeats its former move if it was rewarded
by a high payoﬀ (A or A+ 1), and it switches if it was punished by receiving a low payoﬀ (0 or 1).
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Selten (1983) adapts the notion of ESS to extensive-form games as follows. A perturbation
is a function that assigns a minimal probability to play each action at each information set.
Strategy σ is a limit ESS if it is the limit of ESS of a sequence of perturbed games when the
perturbations converge to 0.6 Observe that any ESS is a limit ESS, and that any limit ESS is a
symmetric perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975, see Corollary 1). Our ﬁrst main result (Theorem
1) shows that σ∗ is a limit ESS (if c (L3) < c (L4)).7
Similar to other repeated games, the interaction admits many stable strategies. In Section
5, we present a folk theorem result: for any k,m and n, there exists a limit ESS in which
everyone has ability Lk, and as long as the horizon is uncertain, players repeat cycles in which
they cooperate m times and defect n times.
Thus, uniqueness is possible only when focusing on a subset of stable strategies. We shall
say that a strategy is early-nice if players cooperate when: (1) the horizon is suﬃciently large,
and (2) no one has ever defected in the past. Equivalently, a strategy is early-nice if it induces
eﬃcient play (mutual cooperation) at early stages of the interaction, also when one of the
players trembles and chooses a diﬀerent ability. Our second main result (Theorem 2) shows
that, if A > 3, then any early-nice limit ESS is equivalent to σ∗: it induces the same distribution
of abilities and the same play on the equilibrium path. In Section 7 we extend the uniqueness
result to weaker solution concepts: a neutrally stable strategy and a perfect equilibrium. Figure
1 graphically summarizes our main results for diﬀerent values of A and p. Observe that no
early-nice stable strategies exist if p is close to either zero or one.
The intuition of Theorem 2 is as follows. Let Lk be the lowest incumbent ability. Observe
that everyone must defect during the last k rounds because the event of reaching the kth to last
round is common knowledge among the players. If Lk is the unique incumbent ability, then
mutants with ability Lk+1 outperform the incumbents by defecting one stage earlier. If there
are two consecutive abilities, then the lower ability is outperformed by the higher one. If there
is a gap of more than two steps between the lowest and the highest ability in the population
and A is suﬃciently large, then it turns out that the strategy is unstable to small perturbations
in the frequencies of the diﬀerent abilities in between. Thus the support must be {Lk, Lk+2}
for some k. If Lk > L1 then mutants with ability L1 can induce additional rounds of mutual
cooperation and outperform the incumbents. Finally, stability fails if p is too close to 0 because
the indirect advantage of having a low ability is too small, and it fails if p is close to one because
players are trapped in an arms race towards earlier defections and higher abilities.
Various arguments motivate us to focus on early-nice strategies: (1) Robson (1990) demon-
strates that secret-handshake mutants in a rich enough environment can take the population
6 A few examples for applications of limit ESS are: Samuelson (1991); Kim (1993, 1994); Bolton (1997);
Leimar (1997).
7 Moreover, we show that σ∗ is the limit of ESS of every sequence of perturbed games (strict limit ESS ).
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away from ineﬃcient states; (2) Fundenberg & Maskin (1990) and Binmore & Samuelson (1992)
study the undiscounted inﬁnitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and show that mutual cooper-
ation at almost all rounds is the unique evolutionarily stable outcome given a small amount
of noise or small costs for using complex strategies; (3) Kreps et al. (1982) study the long
ﬁnitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and show that small uncertainty about the preferences
of the opponent imply mutual cooperation at early stages of the game; (4) the tournaments of
Axelrod (1984) and Wu & Axelrod (1995) suggest that niceness (not being the ﬁrst to defect)
might be a necessary requirement for evolutionary success; and ﬁnally, (5) Selten & Stoecker
(1986) experimentally demonstrate that most subjects satisfy early-niceness when playing the
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in the lab.8
Our formal analysis deals only with the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. It is relatively simple
to extend the results to other games in which looking far ahead decreases eﬃciency, such
as centipede (Rosenthal, 1981). Such interactions are important both in primitive hunter-
gatherer societies (representing sequential gift exchange, see, e.g., Haviland et al. , 2007, p.
440), as well as in modern societies. In Section A.2 we sketch how to extend our results to a
setup in which players also play other games.
We conclude by brieﬂy surveying the related literature. Geanakoplos & Gray (1991) study
8 Selten & Stoecker (1986) experimentally study how people play a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with 10
rounds (see similar results in Andreoni & Miller (1993); Cooper et al. (1996); Bruttel et al. (2012)). They
show that: (1) there is usually mutual cooperation in the ﬁrst six rounds, (2) players begin defecting only during
the last four rounds, and (3) if any player defected, then almost always both players defect at all remaining
stages. Johnson et al. (2002)'s ﬁndings suggest that limited foresight is the main cause for this behavior.
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complex sequential decision problems and describe circumstances under which looking too far
ahead in a decision tree leads to poor choices. Samuelson (1987) and Neyman (1999) show that
if the (exogenous) information structure slightly departs from common knowledge about the
ﬁnal period, then there is an equilibrium in which players almost always cooperate in the ﬁnitely
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Jehiel (2001) assumes limited foresight in the inﬁnitely repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma, and shows that in all equilibria, players cooperate at all stages except
the ﬁrst few rounds. Recently, Mengel (2012) obtains a similar result for the ﬁnitely repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma while using stochastic stability as the solution concept. Our paper diﬀers
from this literature by obtaining limited foresight as a result, rather than assuming it. Stahl
(1993), Stennek (2000) and Mohlin (2012) present evolutionary models of bounded strategic
reasoning (level-k), which are related to our model when p is equal to zero or one. This
paper is novel in introducing partial observability in this setup, and showing that it yields
qualitatively diﬀerent results. Crawford (2003) studies zero-sum games with cheap talk and
shows that naive and sophisticated agents may co-exist and obtain the same payoﬀ.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature that studies the stability of cooperation in
the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (various such papers are cited elsewhere in the introduction).
Our paper presents a novel mechanism to induce cooperation: limited foresight. Moreover, one
may gain additional insights by reinterpreting the abilities as voluntary commitment devices
that are available to the players, with the property (which is implied by early-niceness) that
a committed player cannot punish an opponent who has chosen not to commit. Our results
demonstrate that such simple commitment devices can induce mutual cooperation at all rounds
except the last few, provided that the probability of observing the opponent's commitment is
not too close to either zero or one.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3, we char-
acterize the symmetric Nash equilibrium σ∗. Section 4 shows that strategy σ∗ is a limit ESS.
Section 5 presents a folk-theorem result. Section 6 shows that σ∗ is essentially the unique
early-nice limit ESS, and Section 7 extends it to weaker solution concepts. In Section 8 we
discuss the interpretation of limited foresight and sketch a few extensions and variants, which
are formalized in Appendix A. Finally, Appendix B includes the formal proofs.
2 Model
We study a symmetric 2-player extensive-form game. As discussed in the introduction, the
players should be interpreted as a metaphor for the evolutionary process.9
9 The model also ﬁts two additional interpretations: (1) a biological evolutionary process in which the type
is determined by the gene; and (2) a non-evolutionary strategic interaction in which a player ﬁrst chooses how
much eﬀort to spend on detecting earlier signs that the interaction is going to end soon (his foresight ability),
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2.1 Abilities and Signals
The interaction includes an initial round in which players choose their foresight ability and T
rounds of repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Random variable T − 2 is geometrically distributed
with parameter 1 − δ, where 0 < δ < 1 describes the continuation probability at each stage:
δ = Pr (T > k|T = k) (for each k > 2).10 We focus on the case of δ close enough to 1.
At stage 0 each player i ∈ {1, 2} chooses his ability from the set L = {L1, L2.L3, ..., Lk, ...}.11
We shall say that Lk is larger (resp., weakly larger, smaller) than Lk′ if k > k
′ (resp., k ≥ k′
k < k′). Let L≥k denote the set of abilities weakly larger than Lk. Intuitively, the ability
of a player determines when he will become aware of the realized length of the interaction
and its strategic implications. Formally, a player with ability Lk privately observes at round
max (T− k, 0) the realization of T. In Section 8.1 we discuss the interpretation of the abilities
and the uncertain length.
Players partially observe the ability of the opponent as follows (a` la Dekel et al. , 2007).
At the end of stage 0, each player privately observes his opponent's ability with probability p,
and he obtains no information otherwise (independently of the signal that is observed by his
opponent.)12 We shall say that a player is uninformed as long as he has not yet received the
signal about the realized length, and is informed afterwords. We shall use the term stranger
to describe an opponent whose foresight ability is not observed, and we shall use the term
observing (non-observing) to describe a player who has observed (not observed) his opponent's
ability.
Let c : L → R+ be an arbitrary weakly increasing function, which describes the cognitive
cost of each foresight ability.13 That is, a player who chooses ability Lk obtains a negative payoﬀ
of −c (Lk). Without loss of generality, we normalize: c (L1) = 0. At each stage 1 ≤ t ≤ T the
players play the Prisoner's Dilemma as described in Table 1 with two pure actions -{C,D}.
2.2 Strategies and Payoﬀs
Given i ∈ {1, 2}, let −i denote the other player. An information set of length n > 0 of
player i ∈ {1, 2} is a tuple I = (L, l, s, (ai, a−i)n) where: (1) L ∈ L is the player's ability (as
chosen at stage 0); (2) l ∈ {1, ..., L} ∪ ∞ is the number of remaining periods (dubbed, the
horizon), with l =∞ describing an uninformed agent; (3) s ∈ {L ∪ φ} is the signal about the
and the players play the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.
10 To simplify the presentation of the results, we assume that T−2 rather than T has a geometric distribution.
The results remain qualitatively the same without this assumption.
11 Results are robust to having either a maximal ability or a minimal ability diﬀerent than L1 (see Sec. 8.2).
12 In Section 8.2 we show that the results are robust to the timing in which a player may observe his opponent's
ability, and we demonstrate how to extend to model to allow p to be determined endogenously by the players.
13 We relax the assumption of weakly increasing cognitive costs in Section 8.2.
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opponent's ability, with s = φ describing a non-informative signal (i.e., facing a stranger); and
(4) (ai, a−i)n ∈ ({C,D} × {C,D})n describes the actions that were publicly observed so far in
the game. Let In denote the set of all information sets of length n, and let I = ∪n≥1In be the
set of all information sets.
A behavior strategy (abbreviated, strategy) is a pair σ = (µ, β), where µ ∈ ∆ (L) is a
distribution over the abilities, and β : I → ∆ ({C,D}) is a function that assigns a mixed
action for each information set (dubbed, playing-rule). The abilities in supp (µ) shall be called
the incumbents. Let Σ (B) denote the set of all strategies (playing-rules). With slight abuse
of notation, we can identify a pure distribution with a single ability in its support. A pure
playing-rule, which induces a deterministic play at all information sets, is described by the
function b : I → {C,D}.
The total payoﬀ of the game is the undiscounted sum of the stage payoﬀs (including the
cognitive cost at stage 0). This is formalized as follows. A history of play (abbreviated, history)
of length n is a tuple
(
(L1, L2) , (a1, a2)
n)
where (L1, L2) describes the abilities chosen at stage
0, and (a1, a2)
n
describes the n actions taken at stages 1, ..., n. Let Hn be the set of histories
of length n. For each history hn ∈ Hn, let the payoﬀ of player 1 be deﬁned as follows:
u (hn) = u
((
L1, L2
)
,
(
a1, a2
)n)
=
∑
k≤n
u
(
a1k, a
2
k
)− c (L1) ,
where u (a1, a2) is the Prisoner's Dilemma stage payoﬀ as given by Table 1.
For each game length T , history hT ∈ HT , and pair of strategies σ, σ′, let Prσ,σ′ (hT |T = T )
be the probability of reaching history hT when player 1 plays strategy σ, player 2 plays strategy
σ′, conditional on the random length of the game being equal to T . The expected payoﬀ of a
player who plays strategy σ and faces an opponent who plays strategy σ′ is deﬁned as follows:
u (σ, σ′) =
∑
T∈N
Pr (T = T ) ·
∑
hT∈HT
Pr
σ,σ′
(hT |T = T ) · u (hT ) .
Remark 1. Some readers may wonder why we study a cognitive bias (limited foresight) but
allow agents to use complex strategies with perfect memory. We consider this aspect of the
model an advantage rather than a weakness. The model allows agents to use complex strategies
with long memories and long foresight abilities, and yet, it implies a unique early-nice stable
outcome in which all players choose to have a small foresight ability, and to use simple strategies
that depend only on the realized actions in the previous stage. We note that all our results
remain the same if one adds a restriction to the model either to how many rounds of play the
agents can remember; or to the complexity of strategies that the agents may use.
93 Characterization of a Nash Equilibrium
As mentioned in the Introduction, we use a reduced form static analysis to study the long-run
stable outcomes of a payoﬀ-monotonic dynamic in which more successful types become more
frequent. A state of the population is Lyapunov stable if no small change in the population
composition can lead it away. Nachbar (1990) shows that any Lyapunov stable state is a Nash
equilibrium as well. Motivated by this observation, we characterize in this section a speciﬁc
Nash equilibrium, σ∗. We emphasis that this equilibrium behavior can be achieved by agents
who passively follow their types, rather then actively maximize their payoﬀs.14
A strategy is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if it is a best-reply to itself.
Deﬁnition 1. Strategy σ ∈ Σ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if u (σ, σ) ≥ u (σ′, σ) ∀σ′ ∈ Σ.
Strategy σ∗ assigns positive probabilities to two abilities: L1 and L3, and it induces de-
terministic simple playing-rule: following pavlov (defect iﬀ players played diﬀerently at the
previous round) at long horizons; and defect at short horizons. The horizon in which the be-
havior changes from pavlov to defect depends on the signal about the opponent: it happens at
horizon 2 against strangers and observed L1 opponents, and at horizon 3 otherwise.
Deﬁnition 2. For every p > 0, A > 1 and c (L3) < 1, let σ
∗ = (µ∗, b∗) be as follows:
µ∗ (L1) = 1− 1− c (L3)
p · (A− 1) , µ
∗ (L3) =
1− c (L3)
p · (A− 1) , ∀k /∈ {1, 3} µ
∗ (Lk) = 0;
b∗
(
L, l, s,
(
ai, a−i
)t)
=
C (l ≥ 4 or (l = 3 and s ∈ {L1, φ})) and
(
t = 0 or ait = a
−i
t
)
D otherwise
.
It might be helpful to interpret strategy σ∗ as describing a heterogeneous population of
agents, which includes two fractions with diﬀerent abilities. The L1 agents play pavlov until
the last round of the interaction (in which they defect). The L3 agents play pavlov until they
are being informed about the ﬁnal period. Their behavior at this stage (horizon 3) depends on
the signal about the opponent: they play pavlov if they face a stranger or L1, and they defect
if they obtain a diﬀerent signal. In the last two stages the L3 agents defect.
Our ﬁrst result shows that (µ∗, b∗) is a Nash equilibrium if p is not too close to zero or one,
the cognitive cost of L3 is not too high, and the continuation probability δ is close enough to
one.
Proposition 1. Assume that: (1) A·(1−c(L3))
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
, (2) c (L3) <
1
A
, and (3) δ is suﬃciently
close to 1. Then σ∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
14 Though the result also hold in the presence of sophisticated agents who explicitly maximize their payoﬀs.
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Proposition 1 is implied by Theorem 1 (which is proved in Appendix B, as with the other
results in the paper). The sketch of the proof is as follows. The two fractions of agents in
the population play a Hawk-Dove reduced game: when two L1s (doves) meet, they obtain a
relatively high payoﬀ due to cooperating at all rounds except the last one; an L3 agent achieves
one more utility point against L1 by defecting at horizon 2; and when two L3s meet, they obtain
a relatively low payoﬀ (if p is not too low) because when one of them observes the other, he
defects at horizon 3, and this early defection implies an ineﬃcient outcome. Thus, each fraction
becomes less successful (relative to the other fraction) if its frequency becomes larger, and a
unique frequency (µ∗) balances their payoﬀs.
Next, we show that b∗ is a best reply to σ∗ for all abilities (including abilities in L≥4).
Observe that being cooperative is optimal for uninformed agents (when δ is close enough to
one). This is because the gain from defection (one point) is outweighed by the loss of A − 1
points at the next round, in which the opponent defects instead of cooperating. Informed L1
agents play a dominant action at the last round (defect). Observe that the best reply against
an opponent who plays pavlov until horizon k and defects at shorter horizons is to defect one
round earlier at horizon k + 1. This implies that the behavior of informed L3 agents against
L1 is optimal. The behavior of L3 agents against strangers (start defecting at horizon 2) is
optimal, as long as the fraction of L1 agents (µ
∗ (L1)) is not too low, and this holds if p is
not too small. The behavior of L3 agents when observing an L3 opponent (start defecting at
horizon 3) is optimal (even if they had a larger foresight ability) as long as p is not too high and
the opponent is likely enough to be unobserving. This implies that choosing any ability in L≥4
cannot improve the payoﬀ. Finally, choosing ability L2 yields a strictly lower payoﬀ because:
(1) ability L2 induces the same opponent's behavior as L3; (2) L2 agents cannot defect at
horizon 3 when observing an L3 opponent, and this yields them one less utility point.
Remark 2. Proposition 1 holds also if pavlov is replaced with a diﬀerent reciprocal behavior
that induces cooperative behavior on the equilibrium path, such as tit-for-tat (defect iﬀ the
opponent defected in the previous round), or perfect-grim-trigger (defect iﬀ any player de-
fected before). We present the results with pavlov because it satisﬁes three appealing properties:
(1) it satisﬁes the reﬁnement of evolutionary stability introduced in the next section; contrary
to this, tit-for-tat implies non-optimal play oﬀ the equilibrium path: following a defection
of the opponent, it is strictly better to cooperate rather than defect; (2) it is a very simple
strategy that depends only on the actions of the last round; and (3) it implies eﬃciency (mu-
tual cooperation most of the time) also when there are small error probabilities (see, Nowak &
Sigmund, 1993). Contrary to this, the perfect-grim-trigger induces ineﬃcient play in noisy
environments.
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A Nash equilibrium may be dynamically unstable. Maynard-Smith & Price (1973) reﬁned Nash
equilibrium, and presented the notion of evolutionary stability. A symmetric Nash equilibrium
σ is evolutionarily (neutrally) stable if it achieves a strictly (weakly) better payoﬀ against any
other best-reply strategy σ′. Formally:
Deﬁnition 3. (Maynard-Smith & Price (1973), as reformulated for behavior strategies in
Selten (1983)) Strategy σ ∈ Σ is an evolutionarily (neutrally) stable strategy (abbreviated,
respectively, ESS, NSS) if: (1) it is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and (2) ∀σ′ 6= σ, if u (σ′, σ) =
u (σ, σ) then u (σ, σ′) > u (σ′, σ′) (u (σ, σ′) ≥ u (σ′, σ′).
The motivation for Deﬁnition 3 is that an ESS, if adopted by a population of players
in a given environment, cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare.
Cressman (1997) and Sandholm (2010) show that an ESS is an asymptotic stable state under
a large variety of payoﬀ-monotonic dynamic processes; that is, the population converges to the
ESS from any close enough initial state.15
Repeated games rarely admit an ESS due to the existence of equivalent strategies that
diﬀer only oﬀ the equilibrium path. In particular, our model admits no ESS.16 Selten (1983)
slightly weakens this notion by requiring evolutionary stability in a converging sequence of
perturbed games (but not necessarily in the unperturbed game). Formally:
Deﬁnition 4. (Selten (1983, 1988)) A perturbation (ubiquitous perturbation) ζ is a function
that assigns a non-negative (positive) number for:
1. each ability at stage 0 such that
∑
Lk∈L ζ (Lk) < 1; and
2. each action (C or D) after each information set I ∈ I, such that ζ (C) (I)+ζ (D) (I) < 1.
Let Γ (ζ) be a (symmetric) perturbed version of the game described in Section 2 (perturbed
game), in which each player is limited to choose strategy σ = (µ, β) that satisﬁes: (1) µ (Lk) ≥
ζ (Lk) for each Lk ∈ L, and (2) ζ (I) (C) ≤ β (I) (C) ≤ 1− ζ (I) (D) for each I ∈ I . Let Σ (ζ)
(resp., ∆ζ (L), B (ζ)) the set of all strategies (resp., distributions, playing-rules) that satisfy
these two properties (resp., the ﬁrst property, the second property). Let M (ζ) denote the
maximal tremble of ζ: M (ζ) = max
(
sup Lk∈Lζ (Lk) , sup I∈I,a∈{C,D}ζ (I) (a)
)
.
15 They show this dynamic stability for a slightly stronger notion, regular evolutionarily stable strategy, which
also satisﬁes strictness with respect to strategies outside its support. Strategy σ∗ (Def. 2) satisﬁes regularity in
any ubiquitous perturbed game if c (L3) < c (L4) (see Selten (1988) for a formal deﬁnition of regularity in this
setup.)
16 See Lorberbaum (1994) for a proof that the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with uncertain horizon does not
admit any evolutionarily stable strategy. Similarly, one can adapt the proof, and show that it does not admit
an evolutionarily stable set (Thomas, 1985) or an equilibrium evolutionarily stable set (Swinkels, 1992).
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Deﬁnition 5. (Selten (1983)) Strategy σ ∈ Σ is a limit ESS if there exists a sequence of
perturbations (ζn)n∈N satisfying limn→∞M (ζn) = 0, and for each n ∈ N, there exists an ESS
σn of the perturbed game Γ (ζn), such that limn→∞ σn = σ is satisﬁed.
Observe that any ESS is a limit-ESS, and that any limit ESS is a symmetric perfect equi-
librium (Selten, 1975).17
In order to strengthen our stability result, we present a stronger notion than Deﬁnition 5
by requiring a strict limit ESS to be the limit of ESS of every sequence of strict perturbed
games (rather than a speciﬁc sequence). The motivation (similar to Okada, 1981's notion of
strict-perfection), is that a strong notion of stability should be robust to the speciﬁc structure
of the perturbations. Formally:
Deﬁnition 6. Strategy σ ∈ Σ is a strict limit ESS (strict limit NSS ) if, for every sequence
of ubiquitous perturbations (ζn)n∈N satisfying limn→∞M (ζn) = 0, and for every n ∈ N, there
exists an ESS (NSS) of Γ (ζn), such that limn→∞ σn = σ is satisﬁed.
Our ﬁrst main result strengthens Proposition 1 and shows that σ∗ is a strict limit ESS.
Theorem 1. Assume that: (1) A·(1−c(L3))
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
, (2) c (L3) <
1
A
,18 and (3) δ is suﬃciently
close to 1. Then σ∗ is a strict limit NSS, and if c (L4) > c (L3) then σ∗ is a strict limit ESS.
The sketch of the proof is as follows. Let ζ be any suﬃciently small ubiquitous perturbation,
and let σ∗ζ =
(
µ∗ζ , b
∗
ζ
)
be the closest strategy to σ∗ in the perturbed game G (ζ) that satisﬁes
u
((
L1, b
∗
ζ
)
, σ∗ζ
)
= u
((
L3, b
∗
ζ
)
, σ∗ζ
)
. Lorberbaum et al. (2002) proved that the perturbed-pavlov
is a strict-best reply to itself when playing slightly-perturbed standard repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma (in which players remain uninformed throughout the game). Together with the argu-
ments from the sketch of proof of Proposition 1, this implies that (1) playing-rule b∗ζ is a strict
best-reply to σ∗ζ (for all abilities), (2) ability L2 achieves a strictly lower payoﬀ than L3, and (3)
any ability L>3 can achieve, at most, the same payoﬀs as L3. The properties of the Hawk-Dove
meta-game between abilities L1 and L3 (discussed in Section 3) imply that any strategy with
a diﬀerent frequency of L1-s and L3-s yields a strictly lower payoﬀ. This shows that σ
∗
ζ is an
NSS of Γ (ζ) and an ESS if c (L4) > c (L3).
Remark 3. Minor adaptions to the proof imply a slightly stronger result when c (L4) = c (L3).
Let Las_3 = {Lk|k ≥ 3, c (Lk) = c (L3)} be the abilities with the same costs as L3. Then:
Σ∗ =
{
(µ, β∗) |µ (L1) = µ∗ (L1) and ∀k /∈ Las_3 ∪ {L1} µ (Lk) = 0
}
17 See Corollary 1, which slightly strengthens the result for general extensive-form games of van Damme (1987,
Corollary 9.8.6) that any limit ESS is a sequential equilibrium (Kreps & Wilson (1982))
18 Assumption 2 can be slightly weakened as follows c (L3) < min
(
1, 1A +
(
1− 1A
) · c (L2)).
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is a strict limit evolutionarily stable set: it is the limit of evolutionarily stable sets (Thomas,
1985) of any sequence of converging ubiquitous perturbed games.
5 All Abilities Can be Stable
Strategy σ∗ is eﬃcient in the sense that players always cooperate on the equilibrium path,
except for the last few rounds. The following proposition shows that the game also admits an
ineﬃcient stable strategy in which all players have ability L1 and always defect.
Proposition 2. Let σdef = (L1, bdef ) with bdef ≡ D (always defect). Then σdef is a strict limit
NSS. Moreover, if c (L2) > c (L1) then σdef is a strict limit ESS.
The proof adapts Lorberbaum et al. (2002)'s result that defection is a strict best reply to
itself in the slightly-perturbed repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.
The following proposition shows a folk theorem result: for any ability Lk and for any ﬁnite
sequence of actions, there exists a strict limit ESS in which all players have ability Lk and they
keep playing cycles of the sequence as long as they are uninformed. Formally:
Proposition 3. Let Lk ∈ L, M ∈ N, and S ∈ ({C,D})M 6= (D, ..., D). Assume that 0 < p,
and that δ = δ (p) is suﬃciently close to 1. There exists a strict limit ESS σ = (Lk, β) in which
on the equilibrium path uninformed players repeat playing cycles of the sequence S.
Kim (1994) studies the standard repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and shows that any ﬁnite
sequence of actions can be implemented as a strict limit ESS for δ suﬃciently close to one by
using perfect-grim-trigger punishments oﬀ-equilibrium path. Our proof extends Kim's result
to the setup with abilities as follows. On the equilibrium path, players with ability Lk repeat
playing cycles of the sequence S as long as they are uninformed, and they defect at the last
k stages. If an Lk player observes an Lk′ 6= Lk opponent, he plays a cycle of an asymmetric
sequence of action-proﬁles W ′, which yields the Lk (Lk′) player a higher (lower) payoﬀ relative
to sequence S. If any player deviate from this pattern, both players always defect.
6 Early-Niceness and Uniqueness
A strategy is early-nice if players who follow its playing-rule cooperate when: (1) the horizon
is large enough, and (2) no one has ever defected before. Formally:
Deﬁnition 7. Strategy σ = (µ, β) ∈ Σ is early-nice if there exists Mσ ∈ N such that
β
(
L, l, s, (ai, a−i)n
)
(C) = 1 if: (1) l > Mσ, and (2) (a
i, a−i)n = (C,C)n (dubbed, coopera-
tive information set).
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Early-niceness implies eﬃcient play (mutual cooperation) at early stages of the interaction
on the equilibrium path. Proposition 3 shows that this implication is not enough to restrict the
set of stable abilities: any ability Lk can be the unique incumbent in a limit ESS which induces
early ineﬃcient play only against non-incumbent abilities. Early-niceness also requires eﬃcient
play in cases in which one of the players (or both) has trembled and chosen an ability outside
the support of µ. Note that early-niceness does not restrict the play of a mutant player who
follows a diﬀerent playing-rule.
Two strategies are equivalent if they induce the same distribution of abilities and the same
observable play; they can only diﬀer in their oﬀ-equilibrium behavior. Formally:
Deﬁnition 8. Strategies σ, σ′ ∈ Σ are equivalent if for each possible game length T and for
each history hT ∈ HT : Prσ,σ (hT |T = T ) = Prσ′,σ′ (hT |T = T ).
Our second main result shows that any early-nice limit ESS is equivalent to σ∗ (assuming
a > 3), and that there is no early-nice limit ESS for values of p that are close to either zero or
one.
Theorem 2. Assume that δ is close enough to 1, A > 3, ∀k ∈ N c (Lk+1) − c (Lk) < 1,
c (L4) <
1
A
, and 0 ≤ p < 1. If strategy σ = (µ, β) is a an early-nice limit ESS, then σ ≈ σ∗.
Moreover, if p < A·(1−c(L3))
(A−1)2 or
A−1
A
< p then no early-nice limit ESS exists.
The sketch of the proof is as follows. Let Lk be the lowest incumbent ability in supp (µ),
and assume that all incumbents cooperate with probability one at horizons larger than Mσ.
The inequality c (Lk+1)− c (Lk) < 1 implies that µ (Lk) < 1 (otherwise Lk+1 incumbents could
outperform the incumbents). Observe that on the equilibrium path, everyone defects at the
last k rounds (because, when the horizon is equal to k, this event becomes common knowledge
among the players), and, as a result, all incumbents L≥k+1 defect at horizon k + 1. Next, we
note that early-eﬃciency implies that if any player defects on the equilibrium path, then both
players defect in all the remaining stages (as it becomes common knowledge that the horizon
is at most Mσ).
We ﬁnish the proof by dealing with three separate cases:
1. p < A−1
A
and all incumbents cooperate on the equilibrium path when facing a stranger at
a horizon larger than k + 1. The assumption that p < A−1
A
implies that all incumbents
cooperate on the equilibrium path when the horizon is larger than k + 2 (because the
opponent is likely to be unobserving and to cooperate until horizon k + 1). This implies
that σ must be equivalent to a shifted variant of σ∗, in which abilities Lk and Lk+2 co-
exist and p cannot be too low. Finally, if Lk ≥ L2, then perfection and early-niceness
imply that mutants with ability L1 outperform the Lk incumbents by inducing additional
rounds of cooperation when their ability is observed.
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2. p < A−1
A
and some incumbents defect on the equilibrium path when facing a stranger with
a horizon larger than k + 1. First, we show that all incumbents L≥k+2 must defect with
probability one at horizon k + 2 (otherwise the strategy is not stable to a perturbation
that slightly increases the probability of defection at horizon k + 2). Next, we show that
if A > 3 then it implies that µ (Lk+1) > 0 (otherwise σ is not stable to a perturbation
that slightly increases µ (Lk)). Finally, we compare the payoﬀs of Lk and Lk+1: ability
Lk+1 yields an additional utility point against {Lk, Lk+1} and an additional ﬁxed loss
against higher abilities. This implies that abilities Lk and Lk+1 obtain the same payoﬀ iﬀ
µ (L≥k+2) is equal to a speciﬁc value, but then strategy σ is not stable to a perturbation
that changes the frequency of abilities {Lk, Lk+1} while keeping µ (L≥k+2) ﬁxed.
3. p > A−1
A
. Let k > Mσ, and let m be the largest horizon in which a player with ability
Lk, who observes an opponent with the same ability, defects with a positive probability.
Neutral stability implies that the defection will be with probability one (otherwise the
strategy is not stable to a perturbation that slightly increases the frequency of players that
defect at horizon m). The inequality p > A−1
A
implies that that m = k (otherwise it would
be strictly better to defect at horizon m+ 1), and this contradicts the early-niceness.
We conclude with a few remarks on Theorem 2:
1. Replacing pavlov with perfect-grim-trigger (defect iﬀ any player defected before) at
long horizons yields a strict limit ESS that is equivalent to σ∗ (but not identical, as they
diﬀer in the oﬀ-equilibrium behavior.)
2. In principal, one could adapt the mechanisms that lead to early-niceness in either Funden-
berg & Maskin (1990), Binmore & Samuelson (1992) or Kreps et al. (1982), incorporate
them in our model, and obtain early-niceness as part of the uniqueness result (rather than
as an assumption). We choose not to do this because it involves technical diﬃculties that
would make the model substantially less tractable and less transparent.
3. Theorem 2 holds for any p < 1. If p = 1, then the game may admit a limit ESS with
large abilities in its support. Speciﬁcally, for each k with suﬃciently small c (Lk), one can
show that if a limit ESS exists, it must assign a positive frequency for abilities L≥k (see
a related analysis in Mohlin, 2012).
4. If one omits the condition c (L4) <
1
A
, then the uniqueness result still essentially holds,
except that a limit ESS may also be equivalent to σ∗2 - a shifted variant of σ
∗ that includes
abilities L2 and L4 (see Deﬁnition 2).
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5. If the condition ∀k ∈ N c (Lk+1) − c (Lk) < 1 does not hold, then for suﬃciently low p
there are additional single-ability limit ESS. Speciﬁcally, if c (Lk+1) − c (Lk) > 1 and
p < 1
(A−1)·(k−2) , then a strategy that includes only ability Lk is also a limit ESS.
7 Uniqueness with Weaker Solution Concepts
Theorem 2 shows that σ∗ is essentially the unique early-nice limit ESS. In this section we study
which aspects of the uniqueness hold for weaker solution concepts.
A strategy is a perfect NSS (symmetric perfect equilibrium) if it is the limit of NSS (sym-
metric Nash equilibria) of a converging sequence of ubiquitous perturbed games.
Deﬁnition 9. σ ∈ Σ is a perfect NSS (symmetric perfect equilibrium) if there exists a sequence
of ubiquitous perturbations (ζn)n∈N satisfying limn→∞M (ζn) = 0, and for each n ∈ N, there
exists an NSS (symmetric Nash equilibrium) σn of Γ (ζn), such that limn→∞ σn = σ.
Observe that: (1) any limit ESS is a perfect NSS (by Lemma 1); and (2) any perfect NSS
is a symmetric perfect equilibrium.
The following two deﬁnitions are useful to present the results of this section. Strategy σ∗k is
a k-shifted variant of σ∗, in which ability Lk replaces L1 and ability Lk+2 replaces L2. Formally:
Deﬁnition 10. For each k, let strategy σ∗k =
(
µ∗k, b
∗
k
)
be as follows:
µ∗k (Lk) = 1−
1− (c (Lk+2)− c (Lk))
p · (A− 1) , µ
∗ (Lk+2) = 1− µ∗k (Lk) , ∀k /∈ {k, k + 2} µ∗ (Lk) = 0.
b∗k
(
L, l.s,
(
ai, a−i
)t)
=

C [l ≥ k + 3 or (l = k + 2 and s ∈ {Lk, φ})]
and
(
t = 0 or ait = a
−i
t
)
D otherwise
.
The set Σ∗k ⊆ Σ includes all the strategies that diﬀer from σ∗k only by redistributing
frequency µ∗k (Lk+2) among other abilities Lk that have the same cost and play the same as
Lk+2 (given playing rule b
∗). Formally:
Deﬁnition 11. For each k, let
Σ∗k =
{
(µ, b∗) |µ (Lk) = µ∗k (Lk) , ∀k 6= k µ (Lk) > 0 only if (Lk ≥ Lk+2 and c (Lk) = c (Lk+2))
}
.
The following result shows which aspects of the uniqueness results hold with the weaker
solution concepts. Part (1) shows that, in any symmetric perfect equilibrium, the minimal
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incumbent ability is L1 and the maximal ability is either L3 or L4.
19 Part (2) shows that any
early-eﬃcient NSS is similar to a k-shifted variant of σ∗.20 Part (3) shows that the uniqueness
result essentially holds for early-nice perfect NSS.
Proposition 4. Assume that δ is close enough to 1, ∀k ∈ N c (Lk+1)− c (Lk) < 1, A > 3, and
c (L4) <
1
A
.
1. Assume 1
(A−1)2 < p. If σ = (µ, β) is a an early-nice symmetric perfect equilibrium, then
0 < µ (L1) < 1. Moreover, if
A+1
(A−1)·(A−2) < p <
A−1
A
and c (L5) > c (L4) then µ (L≥5) = 0.
2. Assume p 6= 0.5 and p < A−1
A
. If σ is a an early-nice NSS, then it is equivalent to a
strategy in ∪kΣ∗k. Moreover, if p < A·(1−c(L3))(A−1)2 , then no early-nice NSS exist.
3. Assume p /∈ {1
2
, 1
}
. If σ is an early-nice perfect NSS, then σ ≈ σ′ for some σ′ ∈ Σ∗1.
Moreover, if p < A·(1−c(L3))
(A−1)2 or
A−1
A
< p, then no early-nice perfect NSS exist.
8 Discussion
8.1 Limited foresight and Uncertain Length
In this section we deal with three related questions: (1) Why do we model the interaction as
having uncertain length? (2) Could similar results be obtained in a model with a ﬁxed length?
and (3) Why do we interpret abilities in our model as representing limited foresight?
As argued by Osborne & Rubinstein (1994, chapter 8.2):
A model should attempt to capture the features of reality that the players perceive.
... In a situation that is objectively ﬁnite, a key criterion that determines whether
we should use a model with a ﬁnite or an inﬁnite horizon is whether the last period
enters explicitly into the players' strategic considerations.
Following this argument, we present a hybrid model in which the horizon is inﬁnite and
uncertain, until close to the end, in which the ﬁnal period reaches the agent's foresight ability.
Next we show that similar results can be obtained if the game has a ﬁxed length. Consider a
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with a ﬁxed length L. Agents with limited foresight in this setup
must be unable to count how many rounds remain in the game. This can be formalized by
19 The same result holds for the weaker notion of sequential equilibrium (Kreps & Wilson (1982)) and to a
0-perfect equilibrium, in which the perturbations must assign minimal positive probabilities only at stage 0.
20 The result is stated for p /∈ 0.5 and p < A−1A . See Part (3-f) and footnote 25 for an additional strategy that
may be an early-nice perfect NSS when p = 0.5. When p > A−1A we can show that: (1) for each M , if c (LM ) is
suﬃciently small, then any early-nice NSS includes ability LM in its support, and (2) if M0 is suﬃciently large
and c (LM0) is suﬃciently small, then no early-nice NSS exists.
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restricting agents to strategies that depend only on the actions observed at the last m rounds,
or to strategies that can be implemented by automota with a limited number of states. With
such a restriction, one can adapt our main results (Theorems 1-2) to this setup.
Finally, we discuss the interpretation of limited foresight in our model, and compare it with
an alternative myopic notion that is used in the existing literature (e.g., Jehiel, 2001). In
our model, an agent with ability Lk perceives repeated interactions as inﬁnite (if the horizon
is larger than k). The alternative notion implies that such an agent perceives long repeated
interactions as having, at most, k rounds. The comparison between the two notions can be
facilitated by considering a long 2-player zero-sum game such as Chess. In this setup, agents
with limited foresight (such as computer programs) base their play on a bounded minimax
algorithm that looks a limited number of steps ahead and uses a heuristic evaluation function
to assign values to the states at the horizon.
When moving from chess-like games to non-zero-sum repeated games, the key question is
how Lk agents evaluate states that occur k steps ahead. The myopic notion assigns a constant
value to all non-ﬁnal states. Contrary to this, our notion bases the evaluation of non-ﬁnal states
on the history of play and its inﬂuence on the future play of his opponent. In particular, consider
an L1 agent who plays against an opponent who follows a perfect-grim-trigger. The myopic
notion implies the counter-intuitive prediction that the L1 agent always defects. Our notion
implies that he cooperates until the last stage. As described in Footnote 8, the experimental
evidence from ﬁnitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games suggests that subject behave in a
way which is consistent with our notion of limited foresight.
8.2 Extensions and Variants
We conclude by presenting a few extensions and variants of our model.
In the basic model we followed two common assumptions in the indirect evolutionary
literature (see, e.g., Dekel et al. , 2007): (1) an agent can observe his opponent's ability with a
ﬁxed exogenous probability; and (2) an agent cannot send a false signal about his ability. These
assumptions may seem too restrictive. Completely relaxing them, by allowing each player to
choose at stage 0 both an unobservable true ability and a fake ability that is observed by the
opponent (a cheap-talk model), induces a unique behavior in any Nash equilibrium: everyone
defects at all stages.21 In Appendix A.1 we sketch a variant of the model, which partially
21 To simplify the argument assume that c (Lk) ≡ 0 (the argument can be extended to positive and suﬃ-
ciently small cognitive costs). Assume to the contrary that players cooperate with positive probability on the
equilibrium path. Let m be the smallest horizon in which they cooperate with positive probability. Then the
following strategy is a strictly-better reply: choosing an arbitrary large enough true ability, signaling one of the
fake abilities of the incumbents, playing like the incumbents at horizons larger than m, and defecting during
the last m stages.
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relaxes these assumptions: each player chooses at stage 0 a true ability, a fake ability, and an
eﬀort level, and the probability in which a player observes the true ability (rather than the fake
ability) of the opponent is increasing in the player's eﬀort and decreasing in the opponent's
eﬀort. We show that a σ∗-like strategy remains stable in this setup.
Our basic model deals only with the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and assume that the
cognitive cost function is increasing. In Appendix A.2, we sketch how to extend the results
to other games (assuming that the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is played with suﬃciently
high probability), and to non-monotonic cost functions (which may represent the advantages
of having higher abilities in other games).
Next we show that our results are robust to various changes in the set of abilities. First, we
consider the case in which the minimal ability in L is not L1, but any other arbitrary ability Lk˜
(including ability L0, which is never informed about the realized length of the interaction).
It is straightforward to see that all of our results hold in this setup except that σ∗ is replaced
with its shifted variant σ∗
k˜
(Deﬁnition 10), in which, ability Lk˜ (Lk˜+2) replaces ability L1 (L3) .
Next, we observe that our results hold also if the set of abilities L is extended to include ability
L∞, which is informed about the ﬁnal period at the end of round 0.
The next variant introduces a maximal ability by restricting the set of abilities to be
{L1, ..., LM}. Assuming that M ≥ 3, Theorem 1 holds in this setup. Theorem 2 holds for
ps which are not too close to either zero or one . Assuming that c (LM) is suﬃciently low, one
can complete the characterization for all values of p: (1) for low ps: if a limit ESS exists, then
the only ability in its support is LM (because the indirect commitment advantage of lower
abilities is too small); and (2) for high ps (p > A−1
A
): if a limit ESS exists, then its support
includes ability LM (as a result of the arm race for earlier defections and higher abilities).
Finally, we note that the main results (Theorem 1-2) hold for each of the following changes
to the observation of the opponent's ability:
1. Late observability: Players observe the opponent's ability later in the game (and not at
the end of stage zero). For example, the results hold if a player with ability Lk obtains the
signal about his opponent's ability at horizon k (when he becomes aware to the timing of
the ﬁnal period), or at horizon min (k, k′ + 1) (i.e., a player only observes if his opponent
is going to be informed about the ﬁnal period at the next round).
2. Asymmetric observability (a` la Mohlin, 2012): the informative signal (obtained with
probability p) is the opponent's exact ability, only if it is strictly lower than the agent's
ability; if the opponent's ability is weakly higher, then the agent only observes this fact.
3. Perturbed signals: having a weak correlation between signals of the two players.
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A Variants and Extensions - Formal Details
In this appendix we formally state the deﬁnitions and the results of two extensions of our model.
The formal proofs, which are relatively simple adaptations to the proofs of the results in the
basic model, are omitted for brevity.
A.1 False Signals and Endogenous Observability
In this section, we sketch a variant of the model in which players can inﬂuence the probability
of observing the opponent's ability. A comprehensive analysis of this variant (with a general
underlying game) is left for a separate paper (Heller & Mohlin, 2013).
At stage 0, each player i makes 3 choices: (1) true ability - Li ∈ L, (2) fake ability -
si ∈ L, and (3) eﬀort level ei ∈ R+, which costs ei utility points.22 The model also speciﬁes
an observation function p : R+ × R+ → [0, 1]. When a player who invests eﬀort e1 faces an
opponent who invests eﬀort e2, he privately observes his opponent's true ability with probability
p (e1, e2) and observes the fake ability otherwise. We assume that p (e1, e2) is (1) increasing and
concave in the ﬁrst parameter, (2) decreasing and convex in the second parameter, and (3)
sub-modular:
∂2p(e1,e2)
∂e1∂e2
< 0 (i.e., the eﬀorts of the two players are strategic substitutes).
A strategy in this setup is a pair σ = (µ, β) where µ ∈ ∆ (L × L× R+) is a distribution
over the pure choices at stage 0 (true ability, fake ability and eﬀort level).
Theorem 1 is extended to this setup as follows:
Proposition 5. Assume that: (1) ∃e0 < 1A − c (L3) s.t. ∀e ≤ e0, A·(1−c(L3))(A−1)2 < p (e, e) < A−1A
and
∂p (e1, e2)
∂e1
∣∣∣∣
(e1,e2)=(e0,e0)
− A · ∂p (e
1, e2)
∂e2
∣∣∣∣
(e1,e2)=(e0,e0)
< 1,
(2) c (L4) > c (L3) <
1
A
, and (3) δ is suﬃciently close to 1. Then there exists 0 < e∗ < e0 such
that σ∗ (e∗) = (µ∗ (e∗) , b∗) is a limit ESS, where b∗ is as Def. 2 and µ∗ (e∗) is as follows :
supp (µ∗) = {(L1, L1, 0) , (L3, L1, e∗)} , and µ∗ ((L3, L1, e∗)) = 1− c (L3)− e
∗
p · (A− 1) .
The stable strategy σ∗ (e∗) has two types in its support: (1) agents with ability L1 who do
not expend any eﬀort; and (2) agents with ability L3 who expend eﬀort e
∗(which is determined
by the observability function) and try to deceive their opponent into thinking that they have
ability L1. Agents behave in the same way as in the basic model. In what follows, we brieﬂy
explain the ﬁrst assumption (the remaining two assumptions are identical to Theorem 1), and
22 Similar results also hold if each player chooses two diﬀerent eﬀorts: one for lying, and one for detecting lies.
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the intuition as to why it implies the stability of σ∗ (e∗). Assumption (1) requires the existence
of an eﬀort level e0 that satisﬁes three requirements. (I) e0 is not too large. Observe that if
e < 1
A
−c (L3), then the total cost of an agent with ability L3 who invests eﬀort e is smaller than
1
A
, and is outweighed by its gain from defecting one stage earlier in a population that includes
a large enough fraction of agents with ability L1. The next requirement, (II), is that p (e, e) is
not too close to zero or one (the same bounds as in Theorem 1) for any e ≤ e0: this implies
that the induced observation probability when two L3 agents meet each other (and each spends
eﬀort level e∗ on the equilibrium path) is far enough from zero and one, which is required for
stability from the same reasons as in the basic model. And the third requirement, (III), is
that the marginal contribution of eﬀort at e0 (which is the sum of the marginal contributions
induced by increasing the probability to observe the opponent's ability and by decreasing the
probability that the opponent observes the agent's own type) is smaller then its marginal cost
(=1): this condition implies (by convexity and sub-modularity) that there exists a stable eﬀort
level e∗ < e0.
We conjecture that one could also adapt Theorem 2 to this setup.
A.2 Other Games and Non-Monotonic Costs
Consider the following environment with other games: At the end of stage 0 (after both players
have chosen their abilities), Nature randomly chooses whether to play the repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma (with probability q) or an arbitrary extensive-form game (with probability 1 − q)23
and both players observe the realized game. A strategy in this setup is a triple (µ, β, γ), where
the new component, γ, describes the playing rule in the other game. For each (µ, γ) deﬁne
vµ,γ : L → R as the expected payoﬀ of ability Lk conditional on playing the other game, when
the opponent follows (µ, γ). Deﬁne the net cost function cµ,γ,q : L → R as follows:
cµ,γ,q (Lk) = (c (Lk)− c (L1))− (1− q) · (vµ,γ (Lk)− vµ,γ (L1)) .
In words, cµ,γ,q is the total external cost of choosing ability Lk (relative to L1): the cognitive cost
minus the additional gain that is achieved in the other game. We can extend the basic model
by replacing the ﬁxed cognitive cost function c with the family of net cost functions cµ,γ,q.
This reduced form model captures other games without a loss of generality: any arbitrary
environment with additional games is equivalent to a family of net cost functions.
We shall say that (µ, β, γ) is early eﬃcient if (µ, β) is early eﬃcient. Deﬁne ∆∗γ,q ∈ ∆ (L)
as the set of distributions µ∗γ that satisfy the following conditions:
23 There is no loss of generality in assuming that what is played with probability 1− q is a single game.
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µ∗γ,q (L1) = 1−
1− cµ∗γ,q (L3)
p · (A− 1) , µ
∗ (L3) = 1− µ∗γ,q (L1) , ∀k /∈ {1, 3} µ∗γ,q (Lk) = 0.
That is, µ∗γ,q is similar to µ
∗ of the standard model, except that the cognitive cost of L3 is
replaced with its net cost. Theorem 2 is extended to this setup as follows:
Proposition 6. Assume that A > 3, c (L3) < c (L4) <
1
A
, p < 1, ∀k ∈ N c (Lk+1)− c (Lk) < 1,
and that δ is suﬃciently close to 1. Then there exists q0 < 1, such that for each q0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and
each playing-rule γ, if strategy (µ, β, γ) is a an early-nice limit ESS, then µ ∈ ∆∗γ,q and β ≈ β∗.
Finally, we consider a simpler variant that keeps the structure of a single cost function
c : L → R, but relaxes the assumption that it is weakly increasing (c (L1) is still normalized
to be 0). This non-monotonicity is interpreted as representing external advantages of higher
abilities in other games. To simplify the presentation of the results assume that there exists
a unique ability that minimizes c (Lk) among all abilities in L≥3, and let it be denoted by
Lkˆ = argminLk≥L3 (c (Lk)). Theorem 1 is extended to this setup with ability Lkˆ replacing L3.
Formally:
Deﬁnition 12. For each 1− p · (A− 1) < c (Lkˆ) < 1, let σˆ = (µˆ, β∗) where µˆ is as follows:
µˆ (Lkˆ) =
1− c (Lkˆ)
p · (A− 1) , µˆ (L1) = 1− µˆ (Lkˆ) , ∀k /∈
{
1, kˆ
}
µˆ (Lk) = 0;
Proposition 7. Assume that:
A·(1−c(Lkˆ))
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
, c (Lkˆ) <
1
A
, −c (Lkˆ) < p · (A− 1) − 1,
and δ is suﬃciently close to 1. Then σˆ is a strict limit ESS.
Similarly, Theorem 2 can be extended to this setup in a similar way (if the cognitive costs
are suﬃciently small).
B Proofs
B.1 Limit ESS and Ubiquitous Perturbations
The following lemma shows that if σn is an ESS of a perturbed game of the repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma, then it is also an ESS of a nearby ubiquitous perturbed game.
Lemma 1. Let ζ be a perturbation. Let σ ∈ Σ be an ESS of the perturbed game Γ (ζ). Then
for every  > 0, there exists an ubiquitous perturbation ζ ′ such that: (1) |ζ − ζ ′| < ; (2) σ′ ∈ Σ
is an ESS of the perturbed game Γ (ζ ′); and (3) |σ′ − σ| < .
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Proof. The fact that σ is an ESS implies that it must assign a positive probability to each
information set (otherwise, an equivalent strategy σ′ that diﬀers only in information sets that
are reached with zero probability would get the same payoﬀ as σ: u (σ, σ) = u (σ′, σ) and
u (σ, σ′) = u (σ′, σ′)). This implies that σ must assign a positive probability for each ability and
for each action at each information set in which the horizon is larger than 1. When the horizon
is equal to 1, defection is a dominant action. Let  > 0 be suﬃciently small. Deﬁne a ubiquitous
perturbation ζ ′ as follows: (1) if ζ (I) (a) > 0, let ζ ′ (I) (a) = ζ (I) (a); (2) if ζ (I) (a) = 0 and
the horizon is larger than 1, let ζ ′ (I) (a) = min (, σ (a)) (which is a positive number due to
the previous argument); and (3) when the horizon is equal to one let ζ (I) (a) = . Let σ′ be
equal to σ except at horizon 1, in which it defects with probability 1− . The above arguments
imply that σ′ is an ESS in Γ (ζ ′).
An immediate corollary of Lemma 1 is that every limit ESS is the limit of ESS of a sequence
of ubiquitous perturbed games.
Corollary 1. Let σ ∈ Σ be a limit ESS. There exists a sequence of ubiquitous perturbations
(ζn)n∈N satisfying limn→∞M (ζn) = 0, and for each n ∈ N, there exists an ESS σn of the
perturbed game Γ (ζn), such that limn→∞ σn = σ is satisﬁed.
Proof. The fact that σ is a limit ESS implies that there exists a sequence of perturbations
(ζn)n∈N satisfying: limn→∞M (ζn) = 0, and for each n ∈ N, there exists a strategy σn ∈ Σ (ζn),
which is an ESS of Γ (ζn), and that limn→∞ σn = σ is satisﬁed. Lemma 1 implies that there
exists a sequence of ubiquitous perturbations (ζ ′n)n∈N with the same properties.
Remark 4. The corollary immediately implies that every limit ESS is a perfect NSS (Def.
9) and a symmetric perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975). The proof of Lemma 1 relies on the
property of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma that each player has a dominant action at the last
stage. Slightly weaker results are known for general extensive-form games: any limit ESS is a
symmetric sequential equilibrium (van Damme, 1987, Corollary 9.8.6).
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Proof. The proof includes several parts:
1. Abilities L1 and L3 are best-replies given playing-rule b
∗: u ((L1, b∗) , σ∗) = u ((L3, b∗) , σ∗)
≥ u ((Lk, b∗) , σ∗) for each k /∈ {1, 3} with strict inequality if: c (L4) > c (L3).
(a) Reduced game given b∗. Playing-rule b∗ induces a reduced normal form game in which
each player chooses ability at stage 0, and then players follow b∗ at the remaining
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Tab. 2: Reduced Game (Players Choose abilities, and must follow Playing-Rule b∗)
L1 Lk (k≥3) L2
L1 2 · A A A
Lk (k≥3) 2 · A+ 1− c (Lk) A+ 1− p · A+ p− c (Lk) A+ 1 + p− c (Lk)
L2 2 · A+ 1− c (L2) A+ 1− p · A− c (L2) A+ 1− c (L2)
rounds. Note that the choice of ability only inﬂuences the payoﬀs at stages 0 (cogni-
tive cost), T− 1 (=horizon 2) and T− 2 (=horizon 3), as all abilities play the same
at all other stages (they all play pavlov until stage T − 3 and defect at stage T).
Henceforth, we focus only on the payoﬀs of these 3 stages, and present in Table 2 the
symmetric payoﬀ matrix of this reduced game. The payoﬀs of Table 2 are calculated
as follows: Two players with ability L1 who face each other cooperate at horizons 2
and 3, and obtain 2 · A utility points. A player with ability Lk (k ≥ 2), who faces
L1, defects at horizon 2 and obtains 2 · A+ 1 points (and induces a cognitive cost),
while the L1 opponent obtains only A points. When two L2-s face each other they
both cooperate at horizon 3 and both defect at horizon 2, and they obtain A + 1
points. When an L3 player faces an L2, the outcome depends on whether or not L3
is observing. With probability p, the L3 player is observing and he obtains A + 2
points (by defecting at both horizons) and the L2 opponent obtains one point; with
probability 1 − p, L3 is not observing and both players obtain A + 1 points (both
cooperate at horizon 3 and defect at horizon 2). Finally, when two L3s face each
other, the outcome depends on both observations. If both players are observing
(probability p2), they defect at both horizons and obtain 2. If both are unobserving
(probability (1− p)2), they defect only at horizon 2 and obtain A + 1. If exactly
one of them is observing, the observing player defects at horizon 3, and he obtains
A+ 2 and his opponent obtains one. Aggregating these possible outcomes yields the
following expected payoﬀ at horizons 2 and 3:
p2 · 2 + (1− p)2 · (A+ 1) + p · (1− p) · (A+ 2) + (1− p) · p · 1 = A+ 1− p · A+ p.
(b) Abilities L>3 are weakly dominated by ability L3 and strictly dominated if c (L4) >
c (L3): they obtain the same stage-payoﬀs but they bear higher cognitive costs.
(c) Ability L2 obtains a strictly lower payoﬀ then ability L1.
We have to show that the payoﬀ of ability L2 ((2 · A+ 1) ·µ∗ (L1) + (A+ 1− p · A) ·
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µ∗ (L3)−c (L2)) is strictly smaller than the payoﬀ of ability L3 ((2 · A+ 1) ·µ∗ (L1)+
(A+ 1− p · A+ p) · µ∗ (L3)− c (L3)). This holds iﬀ:
(A+ 1− p · A) · µ∗ (L3)− c (L2)
?
< (A+ 1− p · A+ p) · µ∗ (L3)− c (L3)⇔
c (L3)− c (L2)
?
< p · µ∗ (L3) = 1− c (L3)
A− 1 ⇔
c (L3)
?
<
c (L2) · (A− 1) + 1
A
=
1
A
+
(
1− 1
A
)
· c (L2) ,
and the latter inequality is implied by c (L3) <
1
A
.
(d) Frequency µ∗ balances the payoﬀs between abilities L1 and L3.
Observe that if A+ 1− p ·A+ p− c (Lk) < A, then the reduced game between these
two abilities is of the Hawk-Dove variety: each ability is a strict best-reply to the
other ability. This inequality holds iﬀ:
A+ 1− p · A+ p− c (L3) < A⇔ 1− c (L3)
A− 1 < p.
The latter inequality holds due to the assumption that A·(1−c(L3))
(A−1)2 < p. It is well
known that a Hawk-Dove game admits a unique mixed equilibrium. We now show
that µ∗ is the unique equilibrium. The payoﬀ of L1 is 2 ·A ·µ∗ (L1) +A ·µ∗ (L3), and
the payoﬀ of L3 is (2 · A+ 1) · µ∗ (L1) + (A+ 1− p · A+ p) · µ∗ (L3)− c (L3). These
payoﬀs are equal if:
2·A·µ∗ (L1)+A·µ∗ (L3) ?= (2 · A+ 1)·µ∗ (L1)+(A+ 1− p · A+ p)·µ∗ (L3)−c (L3)⇔
(p · A− p− 1) · µ∗ (L3) + c (L3) ?= µ∗ (L1) = 1− µ∗ (L3)⇔
p · (A− 1) · µ∗ (L3) + c (L3) ?= 1⇔ µ∗ (L3) = 1− c (L3)
p · (A− 1) .
2. Stability against other distributions : If (µ, b∗) 6= σ∗ is a best-reply to σ∗ then u (σ∗, (µ, b∗)) ≥
u ((µ, b∗) , (µ, b∗)) with a strict equality if c (L4) > c (L3).
Part (1) implies that (µ, b∗) is a best-reply to σ∗ iﬀ supp (µ) ⊆ {L1, L3}. The result is an
immediate corollary of the well-known result (see, e.g., Weibull, 1995, Section 2.1.2 ) that
the unique equilibrium in a Hawk-Dove game is an ESS. The intuition for this result is
the observation that, if the frequency of ability L1 becomes larger (smaller), they become
relatively less (more) successful than ability L3.
3. The perturbed game Γ (ζ): Let ζ be any ubiquitous perturbation with suﬃciently small
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maximal tremble M (ζ). Let σ∗ζ =
(
µ∗ζ , β
∗
ζ
)
be deﬁned as follows:
β∗ζ (I) (C) =
ζ (I) (C) b∗ (I) = D1− ζ (I) (D) b∗ (I) = C , µ∗ζ (Lk) =

µ∗ (L1) + η k = 1
ζ (Lk) k 6= 1, 3
1−∑k 6=3 µ∗ζ (Lk) k = 3
,
where η is chosen such that u
((
L1, β
∗
ζ
)
, σ∗ζ
)
= u
((
L3, β
∗
ζ
)
, σ∗ζ
)
. Observe that:
(a) For suﬃciently small M (ζ) , such η exists and its order of magnitude is O (M (ζ))
(due to continuity and the properties of the reduced game described above). This
implies that
∣∣σ∗ζ − σ∗∣∣ ≤ O (M (ζ)).
(b) β∗ζ is the closest playing rule to b
∗ in Σ (ζ).
(c) The perturbed reduced game between abilities, in which the ﬁxed playing-rule is β∗ζ ,
is still a game of Hawk-Dove variety (again, by continuity). Thus the results of parts
(1)-(2) still hold in this setup.
(d) All information sets are reached with positive probability in Γ (ζ).
4. For every µ ∈ ∆ζ (L) and β ∈ B (ζ), u
((
µ, β∗ζ
)
, σ∗ζ
)
> u
(
(µ, β) , σ∗ζ
)
(i.e., β∗ζ is a strictly
optimal playing-rule against strategy σ∗ζ in Γ (ζ) for all abilities).
(a) β∗ζ is strictly optimal for uninformed agents. Recall that as long as players are unin-
formed, playing-rule b∗ is equal to pavlov, and that β∗ζ is the closest strategy to b
∗ in
B (ζ). Lorberbaum et al. (2002) study the standard repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,
in which players remain uninformed throughout the game. They analyze a perturba-
tion that assigns minimal probability  > 0 for each action at each information set.
They show that the -perturbed pavlov (the strategy that defects with probability
1 −  if the players played diﬀerent actions at the previous round, and cooperates
with probability 1− otherwise) is a symmetric strict equilibrium (and hence, also an
ESS) in the -perturbed game. Minor adaptations to their proof (omitted for brevity)
extend the result (for δ suﬃciently close to 1): (1) for any ubiquitous perturbation;
and (2) for the current setup, in which players are informed in the last few rounds.
(b) β∗ζ is strictly optimal for horizons 1 and 2. Defection is a dominant action for
horizon 1. The fact that σ∗ζ induces a very high probability of defection at horizon 1
(regardless of the history), implies that defecting at horizon 2 is a strict best-reply.
(c) Horizon 3 against L3. Defection at horizon 3 yields one more point immediately
(relative to cooperation), while it does not aﬀect future payoﬀs (because, with high
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probability, the opponent defects during the last two rounds regardless of the his-
tory).
(d) Horizon 3 against L1 and strangers. If players played diﬀerent actions in the previous
round, then defection yields both a higher payoﬀ in the current stage, and a higher
expected payoﬀ in the future (as the opponent is likely to defect in the current stage,
and only mutual defection may lead to mutual cooperation at the next round). This
argument works also in larger horizons, and in steps (e)-(f) below we focus on showing
that β∗ζ is optimal only after a previous round in which both players played the same.
If the players played the same action in the previous round, and the opponent is L1,
then cooperation yields (with high probability)24 payoﬀ vector of A,A + 1, 1: A at
horizon 3, A + 1 at horizon 2 (as the L1 opponent cooperates), and one at horizon
1. Defection at horizon 3 yields a vector payoﬀ of at most A + 1, 1, 1 (as the L1
opponent defects at horizon 2). Thus cooperation yields A− 1 more utility points.
We are left with showing that β∗ζ yields a strictly better payoﬀ against strangers.
If the stranger has ability L3, then defection yields one more utility point than
cooperation at horizon 3, and payoﬀs during the last two rounds remain the same.
Thus, defection yields a higher expected payoﬀ against a stranger iﬀ the frequency
of L3 opponents is suﬃciently low: µ
∗ (L3) · 1 < (1− µ∗ (L3)) · (A− 1)⇔
µ∗ (L3) <
A− 1
A
⇔ 1− c (L3)
p · (A− 1) <
A− 1
A
⇔ A · (1− c (L3))
(A− 1)2 < p.
(e) Horizon 4 against L3. Cooperation at horizon 4 (assuming both players played the
same at the previous stage) yields a payoﬀ vector of A, 1, 1, 1 (A,A+ 1, 1, 1) during
the last four rounds when facing an observing (unobserving) opponent. Defection at
horizon 4 yields a payoﬀ of A+ 1, 1, 1, 1 in both cases. Thus, cooperation is a strict
best reply iﬀ: 1 · p < (1− p) · (A− 1)⇔ p < A−1
A
.
(f) Horizon 4 against strangers and L1, and horizons larger than 4 against all opponents.
Cooperation is a strict best reply (assuming both players played the same at the
previous stage) because it yields one less utility point in the current stage (relative
to defection), and A− 1 more points in the next round.
5. Combining the above arguments implies σ∗ζ is an NSS in Γ (ζ) and an ESS if c (L4) >
c (L3). This implies that σ
∗ is a strict limit NSS, and a strict limit ESS if c (L4) > c (L3).
24 Henceforth in the analysis we present strict inequalities by using the payoﬀs that are induced by the
unperturbed strategy σ∗, which approximates the payoﬀs that are induced by σ∗ζ . For suﬃciently small M (ζ),
the inequalities hold also for the slightly-perturbed σ∗ζ . For brevity, we also omit the phrasing with high
probability in the remaining text.
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B.3 Theorem 2: Uniqueness Result
Proof. We begin with a few notations. Let σ = (µ, β) be an early-nice limit ESS. Let Mσ ∈ N
be a large enough integer such that with probability one everyone cooperates at any horizon
larger than Mσ. We shall say that a player faces an incumbent (at a given information set) if
he has observed the opponent to have an incumbent ability or if he faces a stranger (as with
probability one strangers have incumbent abilities). Let Lk ∈ supp (µ) be the lowest incumbent
ability. Recall that an information set I ∈ I cooperative if both players have cooperated at all
previous stages. We shall say ability Lk does X as an abbreviation for playing rule β induces
a player with ability Lk to do X. The proof includes the following parts:
1. Preliminary observations about strategy σ:
(a) On the equilibrium path, everyone defects in the last k rounds.
Intuitively, this is because it is common knowledge among the players whether or
not the horizon is at most k. The formal argument is as follows: Assume to the
contrary that players cooperate with positive probability in the last k rounds on the
equilibrium path. Let m ≤ k be the smallest horizon in which a player cooperates
with positive probability on the equilibrium path. Consider a strategy σ′ that coin-
cides with σ, except that players defect at horizon m with probability one. Observe
that u (σ′, σ) > u (σ, σ) as both strategies induce the same play and yield the same
payoﬀ against σ at all rounds except at horizon m, in which strategy σ′ defects with
probability one and yields a higher payoﬀ.
(b) With probability one, players with ability L≥k+1 defect at horizon k+ 1 when facing
an incumbent. This is because defection at horizon k+1 yields one more utility point
without aﬀecting the opponent's future play (due to the previous step). Similarly,
this implies that players with ability L≥k+2 defect with probability one at horizon
k + 2 when facing an observed incumbent ability L≥k+1.
(c) Early-niceness implies that uninformed players cooperate with probability one at
cooperative information sets (because the unknown horizon has a positive probability
to be larger than Mσ). This is also true if the player has a non-incumbent ability.
(d) If any incumbent ability defects with positive probability when facing an incumbent
at a cooperative information set, and the defection is realized in the game, then both
players defect at all the remaining periods.
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The claim is implied by the observation that after such a defection it becomes com-
mon knowledge that the maximal horizon is Mσ. The proof is analogous to step (a),
and it is omitted for brevity.
(e) µ (Lk) < 1. The assumption that c (Lk+1)−c (Lk) < 1 implies that if µ (Lk) = 1, then
any strategy σ′ that assigns mass one to Lk+1, cooperates when being uninformed
and defects at the last k + 1 stages, is a strictly better reply against σ.
2. Case I: Assume that p < A−1
A
and all incumbents cooperate when: (1) the opponent is a
stranger, (2) the information set is cooperative, and (3) the horizon is strictly larger than
k + 1. Then:
(a) All incumbents cooperate when: (1) the opponent is an incumbent, (2) the informa-
tion set is cooperative, and (3) the horizon is strictly larger than k + 2.
The previous part implies that defection at horizon k + 2 (> k + 2) yields at least
A − 1 (2 · (A− 1)) less points than cooperation against an unobserving opponent
(probability 1 − p). If the opponent is observing (probability p) the maximal gain
from defection is one point (two points), which is obtained if the opponent were
planning to defect at horizon k+ 2 (at the next round also after mutual cooperation
at the current stage). Defection yields a strictly lower payoﬀ if:
(1− p) · (A− 1) > p · 1 ⇔ (A− 1) > A · p ⇔ A− 1
A
> p.
(b) The previous step implies that all incumbents obtain the same payoﬀ at all horizons
except k + 1 and k + 2, and that the reduced game between the abilities at these
horizons is analogous to Table 2 (where Lk replaces L1). As a result: (1) µ (L>k+1) >
0 (otherwise, u ((Lk, β) , σ) < u ((Lk+1, β) , σ) because c (Lk+1) − c (Lk) < 1); and
(2) ∀k > k + 2, µ (L>k+2) > 0 only if c (Lk) = c (Lk+2) (otherwise u ((Lk, β) , σ) <
u ((Lk+2, β) , σ), and σ cannot be an equilibrium).
(c) µ (Lk+1) = 0. Assume to the contrary that µ (Lk+1) > 0. The fact that σ is an equi-
librium implies that u ((Lk, β) , σ) = u ((Lk+1, β) , σ) = u ((Lk+2, β) , σ). Analogous
calculations to part (1-c-d) of Theorem 1's proof imply that Lk and Lk+1 obtain the
same payoﬀ only if:
c (Lk+1)− c (Lk) + µ (L≥k+2) · p · A = 1⇔ µ (L≥k+2) = 1− (c (Lk+1)− c (Lk))
p · A .
Let µ′ be deﬁned as follows: µ′ (Lk) = 0, µ′ (Lk+1) = µ (Lk) + µ (Lk+1), and
µ′ (Lk) = µ (Lk) for each k ≥ k + 2. The fact that supp (µ′) ⊆ supp (µ) im-
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plies that u ((µ′, β) , σ) = u (σ, σ) and the equality µ (L≥k+2) = µ′ (L≥k+2) implies
u (σ, (µ′, β)) = u ((µ′, β) , (µ′, β)) (because µ and µ′ only diﬀer in the frequency of
Lk and Lk+1, and these two abilities yield the same payoﬀ).
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(d) If c (Lk+2) = c (Lk+3) then σ is not a limit ESS. By the previous steps u ((Lk+2, β) , σ) =
u ((Lk+3, β) , σ) (because these two strategies play the same on the equilibrium path),
and this implies that strategy σ′ = (µ′, β) which diﬀers from σ = (µ, β) by an in-
ternal shift in the frequencies of abilities Lk+2 and higher abilities with the same
cognitive costs satisfy: u (σ′, σ) = u (σ, σ) and u (σ′, σ′) = u (σ, σ′). An analogous
property would hold in any suﬃciently close perturbed game, and thus σ cannot be
a limit ESS.
(e) If p <
1−(c(Lk+2)−c(Lk))
A−1 or c (Lk+2) − c (Lk) ≥ 1, then σ is not an equilibrium.
Otherwise,
µ (Lk) = 1− 1− (c (Lk+2)− c (Lk))
p · (A− 1) . (B.1)
The argument is analogous to part (1-d) of the proof of Theorem 1.
(f) Lk = L1 (which implies by the previous steps that σ ≈ σ∗). Assume to the contrary
that Lk > L1:
i. If there is an incumbent ability which defects with positive probability against an
observed L1 opponent, then both players defect at all the renaming rounds.
Intuitively, this is because after such a defection is realized, it becomes common
knowledge that the horizon is at most k. The formal argument is as follows.26
Assume to the contrary, that there is an incumbent ability who defects with
positive probability when facing an observed L1 opponent at a cooperative in-
formation set. Let l ≤ k¯ be the highest horizon in which an incumbent defects
against an observed L1. Assume to the contrary that either player cooperates
with positive probability at any later stage. Let m ≤ l be the farthest round
since the ﬁrst defection, in which at least one of the players cooperates with
positive probability. Consider strategy σ′ that coincides with σ at all informa-
tion sets, except that it defects (with probability 1) m rounds after the initial
defection. Observe that strategy σ′ yields a strictly higher payoﬀ conditional on
playing against L1 opponents. Consider any ubiquitous perturbed game Γ (ζ)
with suﬃciently small M (ζ) . By continuity, any strategy σ′ζ ∈ Σ (ζ) suﬃciently
25 One can show that slightly perturbing µ′ to satisfy µ′
(
Lk+2
)
= µ
(
Lk+2
)
+, would imply that u (σ, (µ′, β)) <
u ((µ′, β) , (µ′, β)) . That is, σ is not an NSS.
26 Note that the argument is slightly more complex than part (1-a), as it deals with an information set oﬀ the
equilibrium path.
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close to σ′ yields a strictly better payoﬀ against any strategy σζ ∈ Σ (ζ) suf-
ﬁciently close to σ (relative to the payoﬀ that σζ yields against itself). This
contradicts the assumption that σ is a perfect equilibrium.
ii. An incumbent ability which faces an observed L1 opponent at a cooperative in-
formation set: (1) cooperates if the horizon is larger than 2; and (2) defects if
the horizon is at most 2.
Defection at any horizon larger than 2 yields a strictly lower payoﬀ due to the
previous step. Cooperating at horizon 2 yields strictly lower payoﬀ, because
it immediately yields one less point, without changing the future play of the
opponent (who always defects at the last stage, as it is a dominant action).
iii. If Lk > L2 then u ((L1, β) , σ) > u ((Lk, β) , σ).
By the previous parts, (L1, β) achieves at most one less utility point (relative
to (Lk, β)) when facing an unobserving Lk opponent, and it achieves at least
A − 1 (A − 2) more points against an observing L>k (Lk) opponent. Thus,
u ((L1, β) , σ) > u ((Lk, β) , σ) if:
(1− p) · µ (Lk)
?
< p · (A− 1− µ (Lk)) + c (Lk)⇔ µ (Lk)
?
< p · (A− 1) + c (Lk) .
Substituting µ (Lk) yields and deﬁning 0 ≤ x ≡ c (Lk+2)− c (Lk) < 1 :
p · (A− 1)− 1 + x
p · (A− 1)
?
< p·(A− 1)+c (Lk)⇔ x
?
< p·(A− 1)·(p · (A− 1) + c (Lk)− 1)+1
Substituting p · (A− 1) ≥ 1− x yields:
x
?
< (1− x) · (1− x+ c (Lk)− 1) + 1⇔ x
?
< (1− x) · (c (Lk)− x) + 1
⇐ x ?< (1− x) · (−x) + 1⇔ 1− 2x+ x2 > 0⇔ (1− x)2 > 0⇐ 0 ≤ x < 1.
iv. If Lk = L2 and c (L4) <
1
A
then u ((L1, β) , σ) > u ((L2, β) , σ).
By the previous parts, (L1, b1) achieves at most one less utility point (relative
to (L2, β)) when facing an L2 opponent, the same payoﬀ when facing an unob-
serving L>2 opponent, and at least A− 1 more points against an observing L>2
opponent. Thus, u ((L1, β) , σ) > u ((L2, β) , σ) if:
µ (L2)
?
< p · (A− 1) · (1− µ (L2)) + c (L2)⇔ µ (L2)
?
<
p · (A− 1) + c (L2)
p · (A− 1) + 1 .
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Substituting µ (L2) from (B.1), implies:
p · (A− 1)− 1 + (c (L4)− c (L2))
p · (A− 1)
?
<
p · (A− 1) + c (L2)
p · (A− 1) + 1
⇔ −1 + (p · (A− 1) + 1) · (c (L4)− c (L2))
?
< p · (A− 1) · c (L2)
⇔ c (L4)− c (L2)
?
<
1 + p · (A− 1) · c (L2)
1 + p · (A− 1) ,
and the last inequality is immediately implied by c (L4) <
1
A
.
3. Case II: Assume that p < A−1
A
and there are incumbents who defect with positive prob-
ability when: (1) the opponent is a stranger, (2) the information set is cooperative, and
(3) the horizon is strictly larger than k + 1. Then:
(a) µ (Lk) ≤ 1A .
Due to part (1-e), defection at horizon k+2 (> k+2) yields A−1 (at least 2·(A− 1))
less utility points relative to cooperating until horizon k+1 if the opponent has ability
Lk , and one (at most two) more points against any other opponent. Such a defection
can yield a weakly better payoﬀ only if:
µ (Lk) · (A− 1) ≤ (1− µ (Lk)) ⇔ µ (Lk) ≤ 1
A
. (B.2)
(b) All incumbent abilities L≥k+2 defect with probability one when facing a stranger at a
cooperative information set with horizon k + 2.
Assume to the contrary that there is an incumbent ability Lk˜ (k˜ ≥ k + 2) that
cooperates with positive probability against strangers at a cooperative information
set with horizon k + 2. Deﬁne strategy σ′ to coincide with σ, except that σ′ defects
with probability one when ability Lk˜ faces a stranger at a cooperative information set
with horizon k + 2. The assumption of case II and part (1-e) imply that u (σ′, σ) ≥
u (σ, σ), and that u (σ′, σ′) > u (σ, σ′) , and we get a contradiction to neutral stability.
(c) µ (Lk+1) > 0. Assume to the contrary that µ (Lk+1) = 0.
i. Assume that p < A−2
A−1 : We compare the payoﬀ of ability Lk and the mean
payoﬀ of any incumbent ability L≥k+2 when facing an Lk opponent: Lk ob-
tains one less utility point when the opponent's ability is observed, and at least
A − 2 more utility points when the opponent is a stranger. This implies that
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u ((Lk, β) , (Lk, β)) > u (σ, (Lk, β)) (which contradicts neutral stability) if:
p < (A− 2) · (1− p)⇔ p < A− 2
A− 1 .
ii. Due to analogous arguments to parts (a-b), µ (Lk) ≤ 1A implies that all incum-
bent abilities L≥k+3 defect with probability one when facing a stranger (or an
incumbent ability in L≥k+2) at a cooperative information set with horizon k+3.
iii. Assume that p ≥ A−2
A−1 : To simplify notation let: α = µ (L≥k+3) /µ (L≥k+2),
and µ = µ (Lk). We compare the payoﬀ of ability Lk and the average payoﬀ
of abilities L≥k+2. Ability Lk yields: (1) at least A − 2 + α · (A− 1) more
points when facing an unobserved Lk opponent (probability (1− p) · µ), (2)
one less point when facing an observed Lk opponent (probability p · µ), (3) at
least A− 2 + α · (A− 1) more points when facing an observing L≥k+2 opponent
(probability p · (1− µ)), (4) at most one less point when facing an unobserved
and unobserving L≥k+2 opponent ((1− p)2 · (1− µ)), and (5) at most 1 +α less
points when facing an observed and unobserving L≥k+2 opponent (probability
(1− p)·p·(1− µ)) . This implies that u ((Lk, β) , σ) > u (σ, σ) (which contradicts
σ being a Nash equilibrium) if:
(A− 2 + α · (A− 1)) (p · (1− µ) + (1− p) · µ) ?> p·µ+(1− p)·(1− µ)·(1 + p · α)
Substituting A > 3 yields:
⇐ (1 + 2 · α) (·p · (1− µ) + (1− p) · µ) ?> p · µ+ (1− p) · (1− µ) · (1 + p · α)
⇔ (2 · p− 1)·(1− 2 · µ)+α (2 · (p · (1− µ) + (1− p) · µ)− (1− p) · (1− µ) · p) ?> 0
⇔ (2 · p− 1) · (1− 2 · µ) + α (p · (1− µ) · (1 + p) + 2 · (1− p) · µ) ?> 0.
Substituting p > A−2
A−1 >
1
2
and µ < 1
A
< 1
3
implies the inequality.
(d)
µ (L≥k+2) =
1− c (Lk+1)
1 + (A− 1) · p. (B.3)
We compare the payoﬀs of ability Lk and ability Lk+1. Ability Lk obtains: one
less point when facing an Lk or Lk+1 opponent, the same payoﬀ when facing an
unobserving L≥k+2 opponent, and A−1 more points when facing an observing L≥k+2
opponent. This implies that u ((Lk, β) , σ) = u ((Lk+1, β) , σ) (which is implied by σ
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being an equilibrium) if and only if:
(A− 1) · p · µ (L≥k+2) = 1− µ (L≥k+2)− (c (Lk+1)− c (Lk))
⇔ µ (L≥k+2) = 1− (c (Lk+1)− c (Lk))
1 + (A− 1) · p .
(e) Strategy σ is not a limit ESS.
Let µ′′ be deﬁned as follows: µ′′ (Lk) = 0, µ′′ (Lk+1) = µ (Lk) + µ (Lk+1), and
µ′′ (Lk) = µ (Lk) for each k > k+1. supp (µ′′) ⊆ supp (µ) implies that u ((µ′′, β) , σ) =
u (σ, σ) and the previous part implies that u (σ, (µ′′, β)) = u ((µ′′, β) , (µ′′, β)) (be-
cause µ (L≥k+2) = µ′′ (L≥k+2)). An analogous property is satisﬁed in any suﬃciently
close perturbed game, and thus σ cannot be a limit ESS.27
4. Case III - Assume that p ≥ A−1
A
. Let k˜ > Mσ. Let m ≤ Mσ be the highest horizon in
which Lk˜ ability defects with a positive probability when facing an observed Lk˜ opponent
at a cooperative information set (m cannot be higher than Mσ due to the assumption of
early-niceness). An analogous argument to part (3b), implies that ability Lk˜ defects with
probability one at horizon m when facing an observed Lk˜ opponent. Finally, an analogous
argument to part (4e) of Theorem 1's proof.) shows that p ≥ A−1
A
implies a contradiction
to the assumption that σ is a limit ESS because defection yields a higher payoﬀ than
cooperation when facing an observed Lk˜ opponent at a cooperative information set with
horizon m+ 1.28
B.4 Other Results:
Proof of Part (1) of Proposition 4 (early-nice symmetric perfect equilibrium)
1. We begin by showing that 0 < µ (L1) < 1. The preliminary observations and Case I of
Theorem 2's proof hold with minor adaptations also for a symmetric perfect equilibrium.
We are left with case II, in which there are incumbents who defect with positive probability
when facing a stranger at a cooperative information set when the horizon is larger than
k + 1 (where Lk is the smallest incumbent). Part (3a) holds also in this setup and
27 One can show that perturbing µ′′ to satisfy either µ′′
(
Lk+2
)
= µ
(
Lk+2
)
+  or µ′′
(
Lk+2
)
= µ
(
Lk+2
)− ,
would imply that u (σ, (µ′′, β)) < u ((µ′, β) , (µ′, β)) for any p 6= 0.5. That is, σ is not an NSS for any p 6= 0.5.
28 If p = A−1A , then defection and cooperation yields the same payoﬀ, and one has to rely also on an analogous
argument to part (3-3b) to imply the contradiction.
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shows that µ (Lk) ≤ 1A . Assume to the contrary that Lk 6= L1. We compare the
payoﬀ of abilities L1 and Lk against σ. Ability L1 obtains at most one less point when
facing an Lk opponent (probability µ (Lk)), the same payoﬀ when facing an unobserving
L>k opponent, and at least A − 1 more points when facing an observing L>k opponent
(probability p · (1− µ (Lk))). Thus, u ((L1, β) , σ) > u ((Lk, β) , σ) = u (σ, σ) (and this
contradicts σ being an equilibrium) if:
µ (Lk) < p·(1− µ (Lk))·(A− 1)⇔ p > µ (Lk)
(1− µ (Lk)) · (A− 1) >
1
A
(A−1)
A
· (A− 1) =
1
(A− 1)2 .
2. We now show that µ (L≥5) = 0.
(a) Assume ﬁrst that µ (L≤2) ≤ 1A . We compare the payoﬀ of (L1, β) and average payoﬀ
of (L≥3, β) against σ. Ability L1 achieves at least A − 2 more points when facing
an observing L≥3 opponent (probability p · (1− µ (L≤2))) , at most two less points
when facing an L≤2 opponent (probability µ (L≤2)), and at most 1 + p less points
when facing an unobserving L≥3 opponent (probability (1− p) ·(1− µ (L≤2))). Thus
u ((L1, β) , σ) > u ((L≥3, β) , σ) (and this contradicts σ being an equilibrium) if:
p · (1− µ (L≤2)) · (A− 2)
?
> 2 · µ (L≤2) + (1 + p) · (1− p) · (1− µ (L≤2))
⇐ p · (1− µ (L≤2)) · (A− 2)
?
> 1 + µ (L≤2)⇔ p
?
>
1 + µ (L≤2)
(1− µ (L≤2)) · (A− 2)
⇐ p ?>
A+1
A
(A−1)
A
· (A− 2) =
A+ 1
(A− 1) · (A− 2) .
(b) Assume that µ (L≤2) > 1A . By an analogous argument to part (4e) of Theorem 1's
proof, it implies that it is strictly better to cooperate at any horizon larger than
three when facing a stranger at a cooperative information set. The assumption
that p < A−1
A
implies by an analogous argument to part (4-e) of Theorem 1's proof
that it is strictly better to cooperate at any horizon larger than four when facing
an incumbent at a cooperative information set. Thus, on the equilibrium path all
incumbents cooperate at all horizons larger than four. This implies that if c (L5) >
c (L4) then all incumbents have ability of at most L4.
The proofs of parts (2-3) of Proposition 4 are very similar to the analogous parts of the proof
of Theorem 2 (omitted for brevity).
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Proof of Proposition 2 ((L1, bdefect) is a strict limit ESS):
Proof. Lorberbaum et al. (2002) study a perturbed variant of the standard repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma, in which there is a ﬁxed minimal probability  > 0 for each action at each information
set. They show that the -perturbed defect (the strategy that defects with probability 1− at all
information sets) is a symmetric strict equilibrium (and hence, also an ESS) in the -perturbed
game. Minor adaptations to their proof (omitted for brevity) allow us to extend the result (for
δ suﬃciently close to one): (1) for any ubiquitous perturbation; and (2) for the current setup,
in which players may become informed earlier about the realized length of the game.
Proof of Proposition 3 (each Lk can be the unique incumbent in a strict limit ESS):
Proof. The proof includes the following parts:
1. Notation and Preliminary deﬁnitions:
(a) Given a ﬁnite action proﬁle Wt = (W
1,W 2) ∈ ({C,D} , {C,D})t, let u¯ (W ) be
the average stage payoﬀ of player 1 who repeats playing cycles of W 1 and faces an
opponent who repeats playing W 2. Let Sj denote the j
th action in the sequence S.
To simplify notation, assume without loss of generality that S1 = C.
(b) Let M ′ ∈ N and let W˙ , W¨ , ...W ∈ ({C,D} , {C,D})M ′ be sequences of action proﬁles
that satisfy the following properties: (1) the sequence W¨ is the reﬂection of W˙ , in
which the roles of players 1 and 2 are exchanged: ∀1 ≤ j ≤M, i ∈ {1, 2} W˙ ij = W¨−ij ;
(2) the sequence W˙ begins with defection: W˙1 = D. (3)
...
W is a symmetric action
proﬁle that begins with mutual defection (
...
W 1 = (D,D)); and (4) the average stage
payoﬀs are ordered as follows: u¯
(
W˙
)
> u¯ ((S, S)) , u¯
( ...
W
)
> u¯
(
W¨
)
> 1.
(c) Let Wt ∈ ({C,D} , {C,D})t be a symmetric action proﬁle of length t, in which
both players repeat playing cycles of S: ∀1 ≤ j ≤ t Wt,j = (SjmodM , SjmodM).
Similarly, let W˙t (resp., W¨ t,
...
W t) be an action proﬁle of length t, in which both
players repeat playing cycles of W˙ (resp., W¨ ,
...
W ): ∀1 ≤ j ≤ t W˙t,j =
(
W˙jmodM ′
)
(resp., W¨t,j =
(
W¨jmodM ′
)
,
...
W t,j =
( ...
W jmodM ′
)
).
2. Deﬁnition of the deterministic playing rule bW,k: At stage 1 bW,k (Lk′ , l.s, ∅) = C iﬀ(
s ∈ {Lk, φ} and
(∃k < l′ < l s.t.W it+1+l−l′ = C)). That is, at stage 1 each player coop-
erates only if he observes his opponent to have the incumbent ability (or a stranger), and
in addition, the horizon is long enough such that his opponent is likely to cooperate in the
future at least once. To simplify the notation below, we slightly abuse it, and write s = Lk
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instead of s = φ when the opponent is a stranger (and has probability 1 to have the in-
cumbent ability Lk). At the remaining stages (t ≥ 1) bW,k
(
Lk′ , l.s = Lk′′ , (a
i, a−i)t
)
= C
iﬀ either of the following conditions hold:((
ai, a−i
)t
= Wt andW
i
t+1 = C and(∃l1, l2 s.t. ((k < l1 < l2 < l) or (k′′ < l1 < l)) andW−it+1+l−l1 = W−it+1+l−l2 = C)) ;
or
((
ai, a−i
)t
= W˙t and W˙
i
t+1 = C andLk′′ 6= Lk and(
∃l1, l2 s.t. ((k < l1 < l2 < l) or (k′′ < l1 < l)) and W¨−it+1+l−l1 = W¨−it+1+l−l2 = C
))
;
or
((
ai, a−i
)t
= W¨t and W¨
i
t+1 = C andLk′ 6= Lk and
(
∃k′′ < l1 < l s.t. W¨−it+1+l−l1 = C
))
or
((
ai, a−i
)t
=
...
W t and
...
W
i
t+1 = C andLk′ , Lk′′ 6= Lk and
(∃k′′ < l1 < l s.t. ...W−it+1+l−l1 = C)) .
That is, the ﬁrst action-proﬁle determines which sequence the players should follow: W
if it was (C,C), W˙ if it was (D,C), W¨ if it was (C,D), and
...
W if it was (D,D). The
players follow this cycle until either of the following occurs:
(a) It becomes common knowledge that either player has deviated in the past - in this
case, both players defect at all remaining stages.
(b) A player knows that his opponent is not going to cooperate in the future (because
the horizon is too short) - in this case he defects.
3. Fix an arbitrary ubiquitous perturbed game Γ (ζ) with suﬃciently small maximal tremble
M (ζ). Let σW,k,ζ = (µW,k,ζ , βW,k,ζ) ∈ Σ (ζ) be the closest strategy to (Lk, bW,k) in Σ (ζ),
and let σ = (µ, β) 6= σW,k,ζ ∈ Σ (ζ) any other strategy. We now show that u (σ, σW,k,ζ) <
u (σW,k,ζ , σW,k,ζ) (i.e, σW,k,ζ is a symmetric strict equilibrium in Σ (ζ)), which implies that
(Lk, bW,k) is a strict limit ESS. The argument is a simple adaptation to Kim (1994)'s folk
theorem result and is brieﬂy sketched as follows:
(a) u ((µ, β) , σW,k,ζ) ≤ u ((µ, βW,k,ζ) , σW,k,ζ). This is because any deviation from playing
rule βW,k, which is observed by the opponent, leads the players to defect at all
remaining stages, and for δ suﬃciently close to 1, the future loss outweighs the gain.
(b) u ((µ, βW,k,ζ) , σW,k,ζ) < u (σW,k,ζ , σW,k,ζ) if µ 6= µW,k. This is because playing-rule
βW,k,ζ induces a strictly higher payoﬀ to Lk and any distribution µ 6= µW,k assigns a
smaller frequency to Lk and higher frequencies to all other abilities.
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